An ICMetrics Based Lightweight Security Architecture Using Lattice Signcryption by Tahir, Ruhma & McDonald-Maier, Klaus
An ICMetrics based Lightweight Security Architecture using Lattice Signcryption 
 
Ruhma Tahir, Klaus McDonald-Maier 
School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering  
University of Essex 
Colchester, United Kingdom 
rtahir@essex.ac.uk, kdm@essex.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract—The advent of embedded systems has completely 
transformed the information landscape. With the explosive 
growth in the use of interactive real-time technologies, this 
internet landscape aims to support an even broader range of 
application domains. The large amount of data that is 
exchanged by these applications has made them an attractive 
target for attacks. Thus it is important to employ security 
mechanisms to protect these systems from attackers. A major 
challenge facing researchers is the resource constrained nature 
of these systems, which renders most of the traditional security 
mechanisms almost useless. In this paper we propose a 
lightweight ICmetrics based security architecture using 
lattices. The features of the proposed architecture fulfill both 
the requirements of security as well as energy efficiency. The 
proposed architecture provides authentication, confidentiality, 
non-repudiation and integrity of data. Using the identity 
information derived from ICmetrics of the device, we further 
construct a signcryption scheme based on lattices that makes 
use of certificateless PKC to achieve the security requirements 
of the design. This scheme is targeted on resource constrained 
environments, and can be used widely in applications that 
require sufficient levels of security with limited resources.  
Keywords-ICMetrics; Lattice based Cryptography; 
signcryption; digital signature; confidentiality; integrity; 
authentication; non-repudiation. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Embedded computing systems play a major part in 
various aspects of life, ranging from their use in single user 
applications to large scale processes [1]. Examples of their 
use in large scale processes could be sensor nodes 
aggregating sensed data and transmitting it to a centralized 
server or simply their use in handheld devices for a range of 
single user applications. With the widespread deployment of 
high speed/bandwidth wireless networks even more 
applications are being ported to embedded systems. 
However embedded systems have limitations in terms of 
power, memory and execution time [1].  
The data exchanged in embedded system applications is 
prone to attacks from unauthorized parties resulting in threat 
of vast amounts of data loss by organizations/ individuals. 
Thus, it is important to employ security mechanisms in 
order to protect the data. The resource constrained nature of 
embedded system networks affects the choice of 
cryptographic mechanisms employed for application 
security [2]. Traditional cryptographic mechanisms which 
provide security are not well suited for these systems. So the 
major challenge in embedded systems is using security 
approaches in accordance with their resource constraints, 
thereby providing authentication, confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation in a resource efficient manner. The 
proposed security architecture has the following features 
that address the security issues in embedded system 
environments in a resource efficient manner: 
 
1) To safeguard against issues related to key 
compromise, the proposed architecture generates the keys 
based on ICmetrics (Integrated Circuit Metrics) [17]. 
ICMetrics generates keys based on the hardware/ software 
characteristics and specification of the device which 
provides an effective means to address the issues related to 
the secrecy of key. Our scheme intends to bind a 
cryptographic key with the device’s ICmetrics information. 
2) For the purpose of identification of the device, we 
propose the use of Certificateless Public Key Cryptography 
(CL-PKC) rather than Certificate based Public Key 
Cryptography (CB-PKC). CB-PKC expends significant 
resources in managing certificates for identification 
purposes whereas CL-PKC does not need certificates for 
their operation. In our scheme a public/private key pair is 
formed by combining the ICMetrics generated key and a 
partial key generated by the Key Generating Centre (KGC). 
3) Our proposed architecture makes use of 
cryptographic primitives based on lattices for providing 
security in a resource efficient manner. Firstly lattice-based 
cryptographic constructions hold a great promise for post-
quantum cryptography and are therefore secure against post 
quantum attacks [3-4]. Secondly since the operations 
making up lattice structures are very efficient and simple, 
they prove to be very appropriate for providing security in 
resource constrained environments.  
4) For guaranteeing authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity and non-repudiation of data in our scheme we 
propose the use of lattice based cryptographic primitives 
coupled with signcryption. Signcryption provides 
confidentiality and digital signatures in a single logical step, 
so rather than having to execute two operations separately 
when using simple encryption our scheme will perform this 
in a single logical thereby saving resources [8].  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows; in 
section 2 we discuss the design goals of the proposed 
lightweight security architecture. Section 3 introduces the 
security primitives on which the design of our proposed 
architecture rests. Section 4 discusses the ICmetrics 
technology and its features elaborating on how ICMetrics 
could be a viable solution for the proposed design. Section 5 
explains how CL-PKC is more appropriate for resource 
constrained environments such as embedded systems. 
Section 6 explains the concept of signcryption and how it can 
help reduce the cost of carrying out operations separately 
required by digital signature and encryption. Section 7 
discusses the concept of lattice based cryptography and the 
mathematical problems that lie at the heart of its design. The 
design of our proposed lightweight security architecture is 
presented in Section 8, with details of its working and the 
analysis of its cost-effectiveness for security in resource 
constrained environments. The conclusion and future work 
for our paper is presented in section 9. 
II. DESIGN GOALS 
Designing security protocols for embedded systems is a 
very challenging task due to their resource constrained 
nature such as limited amount of energy, low processing 
capability, limited storage space and low bandwidth. When 
designing a secure communication protocol between two 
parties, the need is to set a tradeoff between the level of 
security required and the amount of resources available. The 
following section enlists design goals of our proposed 
lightweight architecture: 
 
Message authentication using minimal amount of 
resources is the first and the foremost goal of the proposed 
design. This enables the receiving party to verify that the 
data has not been sent by an illegitimate party. 
 
Data confidentiality using minimal resources is another 
goal of our design so that private information is kept secret 
from unauthorized parties. 
 
Data integrity safeguards the network from illegitimate 
manipulation of data, and ensures the receiver that the data 
is exactly what was sent by the sender. The proposed design 
aims to provide data integrity using minimal resources. 
 
Non-repudiation is another goal of our design that 
ensures that an entity on the network cannot refuse to own a 
piece of information transmitted onto the network.  
III. SECURITY PRIMITIVES 
The design of the proposed lightweight security 
architecture rests on the following security primitives. 
A. Public Key Cryptography 
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) schemes are based on 
public/private key pairs for their operation [13]. As shown 
in fig 1 the sender and receiver each hold a private/ public 
key pair PRS/PUS and PRR/PUR respectively. The public 
keys of both parties are published publically to all 
participants in the network and the private keys are held 
privately by the owner of the key themselves. In PKC the 
sending entity encrypts the data using the public key (PUR) 
of the destined entity so that the recipient can decrypt the 
received data with the associated private key pair (PRR) to 
reveal the original message contents. Similarly if the 
receiver in turn wants to send a message back to the sender 
he/she would encrypt the message with the sender’s public 
key and the sender on receiving the message would decrypt 
the contents with his/her private key. PKC overcomes the 
issues related to secret key sharing between communicating 
entities, since it is based on a public/private key pair setting 
and does not require sharing of secret keys over the 
communication channel. 
  
Figure 1. Public key cryptography 
B. Hash Functions 
A hash function is a cryptographic primitive that 
guarantees data integrity by performing operation on a 
variable sized input block to generate a fixed size hash value 
specific to the data block [13]. Hash functions are used to 
provide data integrity, so they are designed in such a way 
that any change in the input data will bring about a change 
in the generated hash value for that data block. A hash 
function can detect any sort of data manipulation; whether 
it’s intentional and performed by an attacker, or is 
unintentional and is caused by the transmission channel.  
Hash functions have a major role in digital signature 
generation, due to their ability to detect data manipulation 
and length advantages of generated hash value for 
performing further operations. 
C. Digital Signature 
Digital Signatures are PKC schemes that are used to 
provide authentication, integrity and non-repudiation of 
data. Digital Signatures to some extent are similar to 
handwritten signatures, with the added feature of providing 
data integrity [13]. Digital signatures provide a proof of 
message authenticity to the recipient and that the message 
has not been altered in transit. They also provide non-
repudiation in that the sender cannot deny at any point in 
time that the message was not sent by him/her. Digital 
signatures are normally used in applications where it is 
important to detect illegitimate operations taking place such 
as forgery, counterfeiting or tampering of data. Fig. 2 and 3 
show the digital signature process, comprising of digital 
signature generation and digital signature verification, 
detailing how digital signatures provide authentication, 
integrity and non-repudiation of data. 
The digital signature generation process is shown in Fig. 
2 whereby the sending party generates a hash value for the 
input message and signs the generated hash value using 
his/her private key (PRS) to generate a signed message hash. 
Both the signed hash and the original message are further 
encrypted with the receiver’s public key and sent to the 
destined party. 
 
Figure 2. Digital signature generation 
 
In the digital signature verification process as shown in 
Fig. 3, the receiving party decrypts the received data with 
the receiver’s private key (PRR) to reveal the original 
message and the signed message hash. Then the receiver 
further decrypts the signed message hash with the sender’s 
public key (PUS) to authenticate the sender and that the 
claimed sender sent this message and he/she won’t be able 
to deny having signed that message. And finally the receiver 
also computes a message hash on the received message to 
compare both the calculated message hash and the received 
message hash. If the results of both hash values after 
comparison are same, that proves that the message has not 
been altered in transit. 
 
Figure 3. Digital signature verification 
IV. ICMETRICS 
Traditionally cryptographic algorithms have always 
relied on the use of stored keys for functioning of the 
network. However the use of stored keys to enable secure 
communication is threatened by the fact that, if the key used 
to encrypt the data is compromised, it will result in loss of 
data that is encrypted using the compromised key.  
ICmetrics (Integrated Circuit metrics) makes use of 
system level characteristics to provide identification to the 
system [12]. It generates keys based on the hardware/ 
software characteristics and specification of the node. 
ICmetrics compute the required metrics on those hardware 
and software characteristics that are difficult for the attacker 
to deduce [17]. These metrics/ features are not static but 
infact vary in a pre-determined fashion. For example, the 
address and value from the data transactions of a processor; 
its program address; and metrics for the effectiveness of the 
program and data caches derived from performance 
counters, etc [18].  
After each key generation stage the produced encryption 
key is temporary and exists only locally, and the 
reproduction of the key once again takes place from 
measurable characteristics of the integrated circuit [14]. 
ICmetrics generates encryption key from measurable 
properties of a given hardware device, similar to the way 
biometrics extracts human features. 
V. CERTIFICATELESS PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) 
bridges between the Certificate based PKC (CB-PKC) [13] 
schemes and ID based PKC (ID-PKC) schemes. In order to 
guarantee the authenticity of the public key associated with 
an entity, CL-PKC schemes do not make use of certificates 
like traditional CB-PKC schemes do; and nor do CL-PKC 
schemes generate identification based on a user identifier as 
the public key and the private key completely generated by a 
trusted third party. Infact, in CL-PKC schemes the key 
generation process is split between the Key Generating 
Centre (KGC) and the user; thereby a part of the key being 
generated by the KGC and a part of the key generated by the 
user. As a result of this CL-PKC schemes solve the 
certificate management and revocation problems inherent in 
CB-PKC schemes and the key escrow problem in the ID-
PKC schemes. 
VI. SIGNCRYPTION 
Signcryption is a public key primitive proposed by 
Yuliang Zheng in 1997 that performs both the functions of 
digital signature and encryption in a single logical step [6]. 
Signcryption is a substitute to typical signature-then-
encryption schemes but with the added advantage that it 
provides the functionality of both digital signature and 
confidentiality with less computational complexity and 
lower communication cost [8]. For this reason signcryption 
is well suitable for resource constrained devices that require 
security with little resources [14-15]. 
Fig. 4 shows the process of signcryption performed by 
the sending party. The required input parameters are 
generated according to the specific key generation algorithm 
that in turn generates a public/ private key pair for the 
sender. The private key of the sender (PRS) and the public 
key of the receiver (PUR) are used for generating the 
signcryption ciphertext for the message ’M’. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Process of signcryption 
 
 
The process of unsigncryption that is carried out in 
accepting a legitimate message or rejecting an illegitimate 
message is shown in Fig. 5. The public key of the sender 
and the private key of the receiver alongwith the ciphertext 
’C’ are both used to unsigncrypt the ciphertext and give an 
accept/ reject decision [16]. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Process of unsigncryption 
 
VII. LATTICE BASED CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Lattice based cryptography (LBC) is asymmetric 
cryptography based on lattices [11]. A lattice is a set of 
points in n dimensional space with periodic structure. The 
main reason for interest in lattice based cryptographic 
schemes is due to the fact that they are secure against post 
quantum attacks [4]. Secondly another major factor that is 
motivating their usage in cryptographic constructions is 
their property of having worst case hardness and their 
simple constructions since most operations are based on 
modular addition [5].  
Lattices can be used in the construction of various 
encryption schemes, digital signature schemes and hash 
generation schemes to provide authenticity, confidentiality, 
integrity and non-repudiation [7]. The security of lattice 
based security constructions is based on either one of the 
two mathematical problems namely Shortest Vector 
Problem (SVP) or Closest Vector Problem (CVP) [9]. SVP 
states if only the basis of the lattice in known, it is difficult 
to find the shortest vector in the lattice unless the attacker 
has some extra piece of information. The closest vector 
problem states that if the basis of a lattice and a vector not in 
the lattice are known, finding the lattice vector with the least 
distance to the given vector is a hard problem. All lattice 
based cryptosystems are based on either one of the stated 
lattice problems [10]. 
VIII. BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
In our design, we aim to improve the security and 
performance properties without significantly increasing the 
device’s energy consumption. We construct an ICmetrics 
based certificateless signcryption scheme using lattices 
which performs message authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity and non-repudiation of each message. Due to the 
resource restrictions imposed on embedded systems, our 
major objective in designing a new security model is to 
minimize cost-effect of communication overhead and 
computation overhead while maintaining required levels of 
security. 
A. ICmetrics based certificateless PKC 
Key generation based on ICmetric values of the device is 
the first phase of our lightweight architecture for both the 
sender aswell as the receiver as shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7. 
The basis number generated by ICMetrics and the partial 
private key generated by the KGC are both used in the 
generation of public/ private key pair (PUS, PRS) for usage in 
lattice based signcryption. The combination of key from the 
KGC and the secret basis number provides a solution to key 
escrow problem inherent in case of ID-PKC. 
 
 
Figure 6. Proposed architectural diagram for sending side 
 
Traditional ways of key generation/ maintenance are 
unable to provide non-repudiation because keys can be lost, 
captured; or when they are shared with other devices, there 
is no-way to know who the actual device was. Therefore, 
ICmetrics based keys are proposed in our design which 
provide the following advantages: 
• ICMetric keys provide non-repudiation since they 
cannot be lost or forgotten and are permanently associated 
with a particular device based on its hardware/software 
characteristics. 
• ICMetric keys are very difficult to forge since they 
cannot be guessed easily.  
 
The use of CL-PKC in our design also provides 
performance advantages. Firstly it solves key escrow 
inherent in IB-PKC since in our scheme the public/private 
key pair is generated by partial key from KGC and a partial 
key based on basis number. Secondly it also solves the 
problem of high computational cost for generation and 
revocation of digital certificates inherent in CB-PKC.  
As a result, authentication based on ICMetrics coupled with 
CL-PKC is more reliable, secure and resource efficient than 
traditional schemes for providing authentication and non-
repudiation of data. 
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Figure 7. Proposed architectural diagram for receiving side 
B. Lattice based Signcryption  
The second phase of our architecture at both the sender/ 
receiver aims to provide authentication, confidentiality, 
integrity and non-repudiation all in one logical step using 
signcryption based on lattices. Fig. 6 shows the process of 
lattice based signcryption that is performed by the sending 
party. The generated public/ private key pair from the first 
phase is used for the process of generating the signcryption 
ciphertext. The private key of the sender (PRS) and the 
public key of the receiver (PUR) are both used for 
generating the lattice based signcryption ciphertext for the 
message ’M’. 
Subsequently on the receiving side the process of lattice 
based unsigncyrption is carried out. The generated public/ 
private key pair at the receiving end is used in accepting a 
legitimate message or rejecting an illegitimate message. The 
public key of the sender and the private key of the receiver 
alongwith the ciphertext ’C’ are both used to unsigncrypt 
using the lattice unsigncrypt and then finally give an accept/ 
reject decision. 
Lattice based cryptographic constructions are 
particularly selected for our design, firstly due to the 
simplicity of lattice operations while having worst case 
hardness and secondly due to their resistance against post 
quantum attacks. The proposed design provides 
confidentiality as well as integrity for the communicated 
information and ensures authenticity and non-repudiation of 
the participants. Confidentiality and digital signature 
generation is achieved by lattice based signcryption. This 
prevents any illegitimate disclosure of information; and all 
in a single logical step as opposed to a separate process for 
encryption and digital signature generation in traditional 
security settings. So this phase provides double performance 
advantages from both lattices as well as signcryption 
thereby providing authentication, confidentiality, integrity 
and non-repudiation. 
IX. CONCLUSION  
An ICmetrics based security architecture using 
certificateless lattice signcryption scheme is introduced in 
this paper. The proposed scheme effectively combines the 
functionalities of ICMetric keys coupled with CL-PKC for 
providing authentication and non-repudiation; and lattice 
based cryptography coupled with signcryption for providing 
authentication, confidentiality, integrity and non-repudiation 
in a resource efficient manner. By employing our security 
architecture we are able to prevent most of the depicted 
threats while considering the constraints that embedded 
systems demands. The design decisions of our lightweight 
architecture have a number of important consequences and 
make it particularly suitable for resource constrained 
environments, which require elimination of computationally 
expensive and resource intensive operations while providing 
the required security. 
Our future plan is to evaluate the scheme proposed here 
through experiments and analysis, thus benchmarking the 
results against existing schemes that provide security in 
resource constrained environments. We are confident that 
our proposed architecture will be an efficient and viable 
solution for providing comprehensive security in embedded 
systems. 
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